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This article surveys the development and politics of English housing policy from the 1800s 
to the present, arguing that housing policy has never placed the needs and interests of the 
dweller – as a human rights holder– at its centre.  Rather, the individual has been an 
instrument of broader goals or social visions, or envisaged not as a human being per se, but 
as a productive and pacified worker, a self-regulating and responsible asset holder, or a 
savvy financial actor whose quest to climb the housing ladder will generate asset wealth and 
security for herself, and for the state as a whole.  The article argues that the right to housing 
as a human right can act as a touchstone and rallying cry for a more positive housing policy; 
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The right to adequate housing is a right ‘to live somewhere in security, peace and dignity.’1  
It cannot be explained as the bare right to a roof over one’s head, or protected ‘exclusively 
as a commodity.’2  The central and multiple roles that housing plays in the life of any person 
means that when states fail to respect, protect and ensure this right, it raises a critical set of 
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issues about the rights and abilities of people to live and participate in society with equal 
moral dignity and worth.3  Thus, the right to housing can guide us to protect the human 
being and her relationship with housing.  This is an important role, as housing policy can 
all too easily come to focus on the house – and housing in the aggregate – as an instrument 
for broader policy goals.  Behind any policy may lie grand political visions: of urban 
planning, of the pacification of the masses, of economically self-sufficient citizens, and of 
increased GDP achieved through harnessing people’s homes into slick financial 
transactions.  Yet when these aspects of housing are foregrounded, the human being to be 
housed often disappears into the background, or is transformed from a person to a financial 
actor.  When the instrumental roles housing plays come to dominate housing policy, housing 
becomes something that must be done or given to its occupants, either for their own good, 
or for the good of other people.  In these instances, housing policy and the planning of the 
built environment take on a ‘dehumanizing capacity’.4 
 
Until recently, debates around housing policy in the UK – specifically, for the purpose of 
this paper, in England5  – have focussed on housing as an important element of the welfare 
state, and as a driver of the economy.  Discussion of and attention to the morality, identity 
and character of those to be housed has also been a prominent theme, as I argue below.  But 
discussion of housing as a human right has been absent.   
 
Yet recent striking failures of English housing policy to provide adequate, safe housing 
press us to re-evaluate the assumptions behind housing policy.  The government’s own 
statistics state that housing is unaffordable in all but a handful of areas of England,6 and for 
some, meeting housing costs means foregoing other necessities such as food and heating.7 
The number of houses classed as unfit for human habitation, particularly in the private rental 
sector, remains high – the most recent government statistics show that 19% -almost one-
fifth – of homes failed to meet the Decent Homes Standard, and that in the private rental 
sector 35% failed to meet this basic threshold.8  Those forced to live, and sleep, on the streets 
are only the tip of the iceberg of England’s homeless population.9  In 2016, the United 
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) described the lack 
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9 Hohmann, Protecting the Right to Housing in England (n 7) Part 4 (Homelessness). 




of available, affordable, accessible, and adequate housing as a ‘persistent critical situation’10 
and criticised the UK for the significant rise in homelessness, with particular reference to 
England.11   
 
In June 2017, England came face to face with the most tragic and devastating consequences 
of ignoring the need to ensure adequate housing, when Grenfell tower, a 24 floor block of 
flats in an affluent area of London was engulfed in fire, leading to the deaths of at least 70 
people.  The tower, originally built as social housing, housed many economically 
marginalised and racialised inhabitants who had struggled repeatedly to make their concerns 
about the safety and adequacy of their housing heard.12  The aftermath of the devastating 
fire has exposed the State’s failure to value the safety, the rights, and the lives, of households 
and individuals, and in particular to respect, protect and fulfil a right to housing.   
Human rights provide one strategy to resist the dehumanising capacity of housing policy.  
They insist on a common humanity, and make a demand on humanity as a whole that the 
person – the human – be the fundamental and undeniable unit at the base of all questions of 
public policy. Of course, market based approaches also place the individual consumer or 
investor at the centre of the discourse.13  However, these discourses are exclusionary, 
offering rights to particular people through their status as, for example, property owners.   
Human rights strive, at their best, towards inclusion of people by virtue of their humanity, 
and in doing so, can offer an important critique of structural inequalities and status-based 
exclusions, at the same time that they force us to acknowledge our mutual political 
subjectivity and fundamental equality.14      
 
 
In this paper, I survey the historical development of housing policy in the UK, taking 
England as a specific focus and keeping the political story of housing policy firmly in view.  
I focus on the political – rather than the legislative, for example – for two reasons. First, this 
story of housing policy unfolding on the English terrain has not as yet been subject to 
sustained critique through a human rights lens, and particularly, through the prism of a 
human right to housing.  For this reason, this article seeks to open a conversation by placing 
this policy history into the domain of human rights scholarship, by offering insights into the 
right to housing and its potential for policy makers.  In doing so I offer preliminary thoughts 
about the ways a right to housing can be used both to critique, and to reform, the dominant 
housing policy directions in England.  Second, without a robust political commitment to the 
right to housing, underpinned by social movements, as well as scholars and policy makers, 
any legal rights (particularly for the marginalised or disempowered) are likely to remain an 
unfulfilled promise.  Human rights as a progressive project must be underpinned by political 
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struggle, and this struggle can be played out on what are thought of as policy and political, 
as well as strictly legal, terrain.  Indeed, successful legal struggles normally require prior 
and ongoing political work to sustain them, and make any legal success meaningful on the 
ground.15 
 
I argue that since its beginning in the early 19th century, in localised, private endeavours, 
through to the present, housing policy (understood in its broadest sense16) in England has 
been top-down and paternalistic. It has been premised on housing as something to be ‘done’ 
to or for those who need it. The result has been that housing policy is expected to play a role 
in reshaping the individual, and through her, society as a whole.  The effect has been to keep 
the person and her relationship with housing from the centre of housing policy.  This in turn 
has further enabled, and been further enabled by, visions of housing which have little to do 
with the individual dweller, and instead amount to projects of national social engineering.   
 
I argue that the enduring, and ultimately dehumanizing vision of housing policy can be 
critiqued through a human rights perspective that places the idea of the individual as human 
rights holder at its centre, and that a human rights perspective can also guide the construction 
of a more positive vision of housing policy.   
 
I begin by sketching the justification for a human right to housing.  The focus is on the 
conceptual understanding of a right to housing, rather than a detailed analysis of specific 
legal standards in international or regional law and their application, 17 because it is a 
commitment to the conceptual underpinnings of the right to housing that, as a first step, 
must be brought into English housing policy.  I then survey three different phases of English 
housing policy: the development of housing policy from 1800 to the Post World War II peak 
in social housing provision; the commodification of housing as a private asset; and the 
financialisation of housing.  Following this analysis, I  give two examples where the right 
to housing is being used to provide a more positive underpinning for housing policy. The 
first is under the South African Constitution, and the second under the emerging individual 
decisions of the CESCR.  These examples demonstrate how a commitment to the right to 
housing could provide a more positive foundation for English housing policy going forward. 






II THE RIGHT TO HOUSING AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
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Human rights are accorded to human beings as human beings.18  This oft-repeated tautology 
is not an empty statement.  Rather, it encapsulates an insistence on the human being as the 
bearer of inherent qualities that make her human, and as entitled to the protection of those 
qualities.  To put it more simply, human rights protect what it means to be human, and mean 
that no person should be treated as less than human.  To be treated as human, to have human 
rights, is to experience and be guaranteed human dignity.19  
 
Moreover, ‘something significant is gained’ when we make claims in the language of 
rights20.   As Mantouvalou argues, the sentence ‘”I have a right to housing” entails a moral 
imperative that cannot be captured by the sentences “I would prefer not to be homeless” or 
“It would be good if I had a home”, or even “I need shelter”.  Having basic social rights 
invests these claims with normative weight, and necessarily implies that others have a duty 
to respect, protect and fulfil these rights.’21 
 
The existence of, and commitment to, human rights is an insistence that states not cross 
certain red lines around the person, because to do so has the potential to strip from an 
individual what it means to be human, in community with others, and expose the person to 
the risk of being used as a mere instrument by others, in particular by the state.   
 
But why do we need a right to housing, rather than other, associated rights that might 
incidentally protect our housing, such as rights to privacy or to life?22  A human right to 
housing places questions of housing as central, rather than incidental, to any analysis.  It 
forces us to keep sight of the interrelationship between housing and the human.  In this way, 
attention remains on the question of the role housing plays for individuals.  Further, it 
focusses attention on the inherent and fundamental ties between human dignity, freedom, 
belonging, safety, and security, and the material space in which they can be experienced.23  
The right to housing makes a crucial connection between the human being at the heart of 
human rights, and the physical conditions and environment in which she lives her daily life. 
 
Despite its ties to the quotidian, its inherent domesticity, the right to housing is not merely 
about the material conditions of physical infrastructure. As I have argued elsewhere, when 
individuals lack a right to housing, their privacy, freedom, and even identity can be 
jeopardised.24  The denial of housing can amount to the denial of citizenship.  This happens 
not only incidentally, when homeless individuals lose the entitlements of social citizenship, 
such as proof of address required in order to vote or be enrolled in school,25 but in the 
starkest examples when the denial of housing is calculated to strip away the right to belong.  
For example, in Apartheid-era South Africa, material dispossession was an explicit tool of 
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social control and denial of rights.26  The Indian Supreme Court has held that the ultimate 
purpose of adequate shelter is to enable individuals to equip themselves ‘physically, 
mentally and intellectually’ as ‘equal participant[s] in democracy.’27  Waldron has argued 
that when homeless individuals have no place to carry out primal human tasks such as 
sleeping and washing, they are unfree.28  The lack of freedom is not merely one that touches 
on the ability to engage in biologically necessary actions, but is instrumental, perhaps even 
inherent, to one’s ability to belong and to be human.29   
 
Thus the right to housing is based on a recognition that when individuals are destitute, when 
they are homeless and forced to find shelter where they can, when they live in situations 
where their housing is unsafe, their dignity and humanity is, at best, compromised, and at 
worst, stripped away.  The denial of adequate housing goes to the core of what it means to 
be a human being in community with others. 
 
Human rights have value as a philosophical or political commitment underlying our social 
relations.  They have value as a benchmark against which policies and laws can be 
measured. And they have value as hard-law standards, which a state can be held accountable 
for failing to respect, protect and ensure.   
 
In the English context, the right to housing as a human right has remained absent on all three 
levels until very recently.30  This is despite the fact that the UK government has obligations 
in international law to take steps towards the fulfilment of a right to adequate housing under 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).31  While a 
right to housing as a legally enforceable right before the UK courts may be important, I 
argue that, as a starting point, we need at the very least to consider housing as a human right 
on a conceptual or discursive level, to make a philosophical, political and policy 
commitment to housing where the person – the dweller – is the central unit of consideration, 
and her needs, rights and interests are never lost from view or made merely instrumental to 
other objectives.   
                                                 
26 See for eg Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape, v Thubelisha Homes and Others (2010) (3) 
SA 454 (Constitutional Court of South Africa) paras 191-98; G Muller, ‘The Legal Historical Context of 
Urban Forced Evictions in South Africa’ (2013) 19(2) Fundamina 367; M Strauss and S Liebenberg, 
‘Contested Spaces: Housing Rights and Evictions Law in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (2014) 13(3) 
Planning Theory 428, 429-30; AL Higginbotham, Jr, FM Higginbotham and SS Ngcobo, ‘De Jure Housing 
Segregation in the United States and South Africa: the Difficult Pursuit of Racial Justice’ (1990) 4 
University of Illinois Law Review 763, 779–80. 
27 Chameli Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (1996) 2 SCC 549 (Supreme Court of India) 556. 
28 J Waldron, ‘Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom’ (1991) 39 UCLA Law Review 295. 
29 Ibid. See further Hohmann Right to Housing (n 3) 148 – 150.   
30 Activism and advocacy using the right to housing has begun to emerge in the wake of the Grenfell Tower 
Fire in 2017, in the activism of the Focus E15 Mums campaign, and in recent advocacy work under the 
framework of international law.  See, respectively, D. Foster ‘The Grenfell Disaster has Shone a Light on 
How We’ve Lost our Housing Rights’ (n 12); Aditya Chakrabortty, ‘For Real Politics, don’t look to 
parliament but to an empty London housing estate’ Guardian 23 Sept 2014 at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/23/real-politics-empty-london-housing-estate 
(accessed 20 Oct 2017); and the Social Rights Charity JustFair, whose aim is ‘to realise a fairer and more 
just society for everyone in England by monitoring and advocating for the protection of economic and social 
rights, including the rights to health, education, social security, work and an adequate standard of living 
(housing, food and water).’ JustFair, JustFair’s Aims, available at http://www.just-fair.co.uk/about3-c8i1 
(accessed 23 October 2017). 
31 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.  The United Kingdom signed the Convention in 1968, and ratified it in 
1976.   





      
 




The development of a system of state provided and subsidised housing is a great 
achievement of the British welfare state.  Beginning before World War I, but increasing 
through to the 1970s, state provided ‘council’ housing transformed the living conditions and 
circumstances of millions of English households.32 In this section I provide a brief history 
of these developments.  Notwithstanding the positive transformation in the living standards 
of so many, brought about by the growth of social housing, housing policy in England was, 
from the beginning, premised on the vision of the dweller as a useful social citizen, 
productive worker, and pacified social citizen.  Housing was an instrument through which 
such citizens were to be created, and managed, in service of these visions   
 
First I trace the development of English housing policy from the early 1800s through to the 
post-World War II peak in the provision of social housing.  The conventional wisdom is 
that this period was the golden era of the welfare state, when social solidarity was high, the 
population insisted on ‘Homes fit for Heroes’, and the state agreed.33  Yet the provision of 
state subsidised housing had as much to do with creating a certain type of citizen, and 
producing a stable and productive (even pacified) workforce, as it did honouring the heroes 
of the nation.  After the 1970s, and particularly with the Thatcher government’s ‘right to 
buy’, homeownership came to dominate the policy agenda.  The government supported 
private purchase, at the same time pushing the population away from state owned housing 
and towards the ideal of housing as a privately owned asset for the responsible self-
supporting citizen, a shift I consider in the next section.  Finally I consider how most 
recently, housing has come to be understood not just in a commodified sense, as an asset, 
but as a central pillar of the global financial system, with homeowners understood as 
‘leveraged investors’, increasing their asset wealth through climbing ever higher up the 









Before World War I, almost 90 percent of British households were in privately rented 
accommodation, and the remaining 10 percent owned their homes.34  Homeownership was 
the preserve of the financially empowered few – the propertied – and was tied to substantial 
                                                 
32 A Ravetz, Council Housing and Culture: The History of a Social Experiment (Routledge 2001) 2.  
33 For two analyses, both sceptical of this conventional portrayal, see L Hanley, Estates an Intimate History 
(Granta 2012) 79-80; D Wincott, ‘The (Golden) Age of the Welfare State: Interrogating a Conventional 
Wisdom’ (2013) 91 Public Administration 806.  
34 C. Hamnett, ‘Housing the Two Nations: Socio-Tenurial Polarization in England and Wales’ (1984) 43 
Urban Studies 339, 339.   




political power which helped maintain the privileged position of the homeowner.35  As a 
consequence of this concentration of ownership, those renting represented a wide swathe of 
society.36  However, it was the dire living conditions of the poor and working classes that 
motivated social reformers, particularly in the context of migration to urban areas as 
England industrialised37 (although the squalid and neglected housing available to the rural 
poor should be understood as a significant factor in that migration38).  In urban areas in the 
19th century, poor housing was jammed together, separated only by narrow alleyways, 
surrounded by pools of raw sewage and mounds of rotting waste.39  Services such as clean 
water for drinking or washing were barely available, and when they were, exorbitantly 
expensive.40 Housing was seriously overcrowded, ‘people sleeping five or six to a bed, three 
beds to a room, two or three families to a stair, dozens of houses around one back green.’41 
 
Housing conditions clearly represented a threat to human health, as identified in Edwin 
Chadwick’s 1842 Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great 
Britain.42  One incentive for reform, therefore, was the desire to avoid the devastation 
wreaked by disease, but the concern was not merely philanthropic.  It rested in part on the 
self-interest of the more privileged citizens, who feared contagion.43  Sanitation schemes 
did reduce epidemics, but the clearance of unsanitary slums increased overcrowding as 
those evicted squeezed into already existing housing, and the living conditions overall 
barely improved for labourers and the poor.44   
 
The links between poor housing and poor sanitation meant that the drive for housing 
improvements was often only tangentially the subject matter of a social mission.45  
Philanthropic initiatives frequently combined concern with the wellbeing of the poor with 
apparent disgust in them. Leading social reformers such as Edward Denison (who pioneered 
the settlement movement), for instance, likened the subjects of their improving projects to 
‘the trembling mass of maggots in a lump of carrion.’46  Descriptions of the time are quick 
to link physical decay and disease with a degraded moral character.  For example, in his The 
Condition of the Working Class in England Friedrich Engels described the notorious slums 
of the 1840s in fascinated detail.  Of the courts and alleyways in the infamous St Giles, he 
writes: 
                                                 
35 See for example L. Holcombe, Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women’s Property Law in 
Nineteenth Century England (University of Toronto Press 1983). 
36 Hamnett (n 34) 389. 
37 S Szreter, ‘Industrialisation and Health’ (2004) 69 British Medical Bulletin 75, p. 80.    
38 E. Gauldie, Cruel Habitations: A History of Working-Class Housing 1780 - 1918 (Unwin University 
Books 1974) 21.   
39 See F. Engels, The Condition of the Working Classes in England (Oxford 2009) 40.  See also Gauldie (n 
38) Ch 5.   
40 Gauldie, (n 38) Ch 5.   
41 Ibid. 87.   
42 Edwin Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain (1842) 
available at http://www.deltaomega.org/documents/ChadwickClassic.pdf (accessed 23 October 2017). 
43 P Baldwin, Contagion and the State in Europe 1830 – 1930 (CUP 2004). 
44 Gauldie (n 38) 85-86.   
45 See J Burnett, A Social History of Housing 1815 – 1985 (2nd ed) (Methuen 1986) 54; Ravetz (n 32) Chs 2-
3; D Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (CUP 2011) 357; Gauldie (n 38) 85.  P. Beresford, All Our Welfare: 
Towards Participatory Social Policy (Policy Press 2016) 29 – 48.  This response is far from unique to the 
English context.  Haussmann’s Paris provides one historical example.  See for example DP Jordan, 
‘Haussmann and Haussmannisation: The Legacy for Paris’ (2004) 27 French Historical Studies 87. In the 
Indian and South African Contexts see Hohmann Right to Housing, (n 3) Chs 7 and 8. 
46 G Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society 
(Verso 1984) 258.  





Here live the poorest of the poor, the worst paid workers with thieves and the 
victims of prostitution indiscriminately huddled together, the majority Irish, or 
of Irish extraction, and those who have not yet sunk in the whirlpool of moral 
ruin which surrounds them, sinking daily deeper, losing daily more and more of 
their power to resist the demoralizing influence of want, filth, and evil 
surroundings.47   
 
Here, poor housing is readily associated with the filth of rotting food and raw sewage.  But 
it is evident that the concern is also with the character of the inhabitants: thieves, prostitutes 
and the Irish bearing the brunt of moral tarring.  The assumption was that the physical decay 
and degradation of the built environment would drag the inhabitants into ever greater moral 
decay.48   
 
The impetus for reform thus rested on recognition of the squalor, need and deprivation of 
the poor and working classes.  But importantly, reform sought to contain the moral and 
physical threat the poor and labouring classes appeared to represent.49     
 
Early initiatives at improving housing for the poor or labouring classes were led by 
prominent individuals and were private and local in nature, though often on a grand scale.  
The model workers’ cottages built at Holkham in Norfolk by the Earl of Leicester in the 
1820s50 and even in the 1760s by John Howard on his estate in Bedfordshire,51 are 
exemplars.  These cottages, their builders agreed, (echoing Chadwick’s report) produced in 
their inhabitants ‘moral regeneration, decreased pauperism, disease and drunkenness and 
increased contentment.’52  Larger model suburbs were also constructed for factory and 
industrial labourers from the 1850s.  The well-known examples of Saltaire, Bournville and 
Port Sunlight were envisaged as a ‘total solution to the social problems of an industrialised 
society’.53  As Burnett notes these schemes were ‘serious and highly influential attempts’ to 
better the living environment of labourers.54  But, as the example of Salt suggests, these 
model living environments were not constructed for their own sake, nor wholly for the sake 
of the individuals to be housed in them, but at least in part for the productive, creditable 
workforce that each produced (and reproduced).  Titus Salt ‘considered himself well 
rewarded by the morality and self-respect, the absence of drunkenness and illegitimacy with 
which his workforce was credited.’55  Housing thus supported a stable, profitable economy, 
and it can be argued that its ‘use value’ to its occupants was only ‘tenuously’ connected to 
its function as an ‘investment in a healthy and productive labour force.’56 
 
An additional layer of anxiety was added to the mix in the early 1900s: that poor housing 
led to dangerous social unrest.57 In April 1919, King George V gave a speech to the 
                                                 
47 Engels (n 39) 40. 
48 Id. See also M Bowley, Housing and the State: 1919 – 1944 (Allen & Unwin 1945) 2. 
49 Beresford, (n 45) 37 – 41.   
50 See Burnett, (n 45) 50, 52.   
51 Ibid. 47.   
52 Ibid 52.   
53 Ibid. 181; see further 182 – 83.   
54 Ibid 181.   
55 Id.   
56 TA Markus, ‘Rehumanizing the Dehumanized’ in Rehumanizing Housing (n 4) 7.   
57 Burnet, (n 45) 225; Beresford (45) 37-41. See also T Judt, ‘The Social Democratic Moment’ in T Judt (ed) 
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Representatives of the Local Authorities and Societies.  He stated that: ‘It is not too much 
to say that an adequate solution of the housing question is the foundation of all social 
progress. …  if “unrest” is to be converted into contentment, the provision of good houses 
may prove one of the most potent agents in that conversion.’58 Adequate housing functioned 
as a policy of ‘deliberate anaesthetic’ to wider social realities of inequality and oppression.59  
As such, housing solutions were intended to deal with economic, political and social 
instability on a societal level.   
 
From the early 1900s, the Westminster government invested heavily in state constructed 
and subsidised housing, recognising that a combination of the poor’s own efforts, the 
patronage of individual reformers, and the operation of the market were insufficient to deal 
with the scale of housing inadequacy.60 In 1885, the Royal Commission on the Housing of 
the Working Classes reported.61  It recognised that the state would have to take collective 
responsibility for the provision of housing, and that subsidisation might be necessary.62 
   
Before 1945, legislation was confined to improvements for the ‘working classes,’ as 
evidenced by the names of the relevant housing Acts, which included the Labouring Classes 
Dwelling Houses Act 1866 and the Housing of the Working Classes Acts of 1855, 1890, 
and 1900.63  By the inter-war years, such social housing schemes could be described as a 
legislative scheme for ‘council housing’.64 Some policy makers saw the aim of council 
housing as establishing an ideal social mix, harkening back to a romanticised vision of the 
English village where everyone from the doctor to the labourer lived together in the same 
street, in the same quality housing.65  Nevertheless, the reality continued to exclude the most 
deprived: Inter-war council housing generally provided dwellings for relatively well-off 
working people, not the most marginalised labourers, immigrants or slum-dwellers.66 When 
the worst-off were housed, such as in the wake of slum clearances, concerns were raised 
about their ‘bad influence’ on other council tenants,67 and they were often subject to 
intensive management and segregation in particular parts of estates.68 
 
Despite the relatively well-off position of most council house tenants within the working 
classes, it was not until World War II that the emphasis in social housing provision shifted 
from the working classes to encompass all sectors of the population.  This shift was partly 
achieved because adequate housing – ‘Homes Fit for Heroes’ – was seen as an entitlement 
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of the returning serviceman.69 Thus, the housing constructed in the immediate post-war 
period was of good quality, making social housing a tenure of choice.70 
 
The commitment to a programme of council housing peaked in the wake of World War II.71 
In the early 1950s, the UK was building 300,000 homes a year, two thirds of which were 
council houses. In 1975, council housing comprised almost a third of the housing stock, and 
housed more than a third of the population.72 This was a major achievement of post-war 
reconstruction and improvement of pre-war housing conditions. The number of houses built, 
the achievement of greater social mobility and mix, and the explicit commitment to adequate 
housing for all led to significantly better opportunities for a multitude of people.73   
 
Nevertheless, housing policy at the time focussed on the production of housing and its 
management, and the place of the individual occupier was as ‘a passive recipient with few 
express rights.’74 Policy was paternalistic, and the housing produced often appeared to be 
disconnected from the aspirations and needs of the individuals for whom it was built.  Over 
time, quantity came to trump quality, and social and physical isolation came to characterise 
much state provided housing.75 By the 1970s, high-rise tower blocks ‘became a cliché for 
the failure of the welfare state policy makers to listen to what people on the receiving end 
wanted or had to say.’76 
 
During this period, housing policy achieved massive, positive, transformations in the living 
conditions of a great many people. But the human subject of housing policy functioned as 
an instrument, rather than as a bearer of human rights and of equal moral worth and 
consideration. Housing policy catered to the creation of a peaceful and productive 
workforce.  It worked to subdue powerful ideas stirred up by workers’ revolutions in Russia 
and elsewhere.It sought to provide better housing to contain the risk of contagion – both 
moral and physical. And it sought to reward service to the state, particularly of those 
returning from the Second World War. Although this era – particularly the immediate post-
World War II years – is often considered the golden age of social housing, the history 
sketched here reveals that the picture is more complex, and that housing policy served to 





2. Homeownership: the Creation of a ‘Deep and Natural Need’ 
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In this context of top-down housing solutions, the idea of rights for occupiers struck a 
powerful chord.  And the right to ownership was presented as the pinnacle of property rights, 
granting all the agency, status and recognition afforded to those attaining the status of 
owner.77 The Thatcher government’s ‘right to buy’, which offered council tenants the right 
to purchase their home at a subsidised price, was eagerly embraced.     
 
In 1971, even before the number of council house units being built peaked and began to 
decline, a Government White Paper argued that ‘home ownership is the most rewarding 
form of house tenure.  It satisfies a deep and natural need on the part of the householder to 
have independent control of the home that shelters him and his family.’78  Homeownership 
was presented as natural, the self-evident choice of the responsible family man. The White 
Paper stated that home ownership:  
 
gives [the owner] the greatest possible security against the loss of his home; and 
particularly against price changes that may threaten his ability to keep it. If the 
householder buys his home on a mortgage, he builds up by steady saving a capital 
asset for himself and his dependents.79   
 
The picture presented of the dweller is one of an economically self-sufficient actor, taking 
personal responsibility for his and his family’s present and future. The home owner is 
imagined as having economic agency, and the dwelling is envisioned as the asset supporting 
that agency.   
 
The White Paper demonstrates a commodified understanding of the nature and role of 
housing.  On this view, housing may play a role as a home, but the house also functions as 
a private economic asset, which is to provide financial security to the family both in the 
present and the future, and to make the household autonomous and responsible, employing 
the ‘self-regulatory capacity’ of the citizen.80   
 
Moreover, subjecting households to the mortgage market imposed on them the restraint of 
periodic payments, necessarily imposing a discipline of regular work . The ongoing 
implications of this disciplining are explored further below, when we consider the 
financialisation of housing and the creation of the ‘leveraged investor’ as the person at the 
heart of housing policy in the next section.   
 
The preference of the English household for owner occupied housing cannot, despite the 
language of the White Paper, be understood as resting on ‘a deep and natural need’.  Rather, 
it has been achieved by a sophisticated array of legislative and policy tools, which privilege 
private homeownership, transfer public housing stock into private hands, and 
simultaneously make the remaining council housing less well supported and appealing as 
an option.  
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These tools have included not only the ‘right to buy’ policy, which in giving a statutory 
right of purchase to tenants also compelled the sale of council housing,81 but also financial 
deregulation of the mortgage market, and the redirection of public funds from social housing 
to the private rental market and to promote homeownership.82 Not all housing has been sold 
to private individuals through ‘the right to buy:’ a wide range of privatisation techniques 
have been used. Privatising has involved transferring council housing to charities, for 
instance, which operate as private providers of social housing called ‘housing 
associations’.83 These privatisation initiatives became a national government programme in 
1997, increasingly relying on private finance and resulting in the further commercialisation 
of non-profit housing over time.84   
 
The ‘New Labour’ government (1997 to 2010) had a target of selling 200,000 council homes 
per year, which was complemented by large scale ‘regeneration’ schemes in areas with 
depressed or ‘failed’ housing markets.85  These ‘regenerations’ often took the form of the 
demolition of existing council housing estates, the displacement of their residents, and their 
replacement with new private housing.86 The changes in tenure patterns and housing stock 
infrastructure have, accordingly, occurred not merely through neglect of existing social 
housing – although the neglect of existing stock emerged, at times, as an explicit policy 
tool87 – but through the active use of laws and policies which make it evident that it is the 
state that has actively constructed, supported and furthered the creation of a housing market 
in England.88  
 
Since 1980, over 2 million social homes have been privatised.89  Privatisation of council 
housing increased significantly under New Labour,90 and recent government policy 
continues to pursue privatisation and the extension of ‘the right to buy’.91The combined 
effect of these policy changes mean that, now, council housing has become increasingly 
‘residual’.92  One of the effects of this residualisation has been a striking change in those 
dwelling in housing of different tenure types: where once only the better-off of the working 
classes enjoyed social housing tenure, now social housing is the lot of the most marginalised 
and economically disempowered.93   
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Despite the strong language of rights attached to the ‘right to buy’, human rights are absent 
from this discourse. The rights at stake here are the rights of the consumer.  Housing as an 
asset is premised on the private acquisition of property, not on human rights as rights to 
equal dignity and moral worth, and not on social solidarity as implicit in the provision of 
‘homes fit for heroes.’ But it is not only the role of housing which is altered when housing’s 
purpose is understood as private and individual.  The role of the occupier changes too: with 
the commodification of housing has come the commodification of the person. In a political 
economy where, as Hobsbawn writes, political participation is replaced by market 
participation, what counts is the person’s market power and potential market contribution.94 
The conceptualisation of the house as consumer asset, rather than primarily or 
fundamentally as home, is tied up with the understanding of the individual as a consumer: 
it is not a coincidence that social housing is now a ‘product’.95   
 
The vision of home owner as consumer has had a clear impact on the way social housing, 
and most importantly, its occupants, are understood.  If we come to identify, or even give 
identity to, individuals through the commodities they purchase,96 those without their own 
commodities, or without purchasing power over commodities, are relegated to a lesser 
subjectivity through their lesser or ‘failed’ consumer status.97  Tenants, for example, suffer 
in a world of commodified housing not only because of the disinvestment in social housing 
which has accompanied privatisation, but because tenancies become a lesser form of tenure.  
The lesser value accorded to tenancy has a knock on effect to the tenant.  The ‘consumer 
power’ that comes with individual homeownership is not enjoyed by the tenants, thereby 
compounding the economic and political powerlessness that is associated with the status of 
non-owner.98   
 
In the most egregious of examples, those outside the market cease to be part of the warp and 
weft of the social fabric. An inability to participate actively in the economic system 
fundamentally diminishes their equality in society, their status as persons, and accordingly 
the worth, care and attention they are afforded in and through social policy and by others 
more broadly. They are not considered, or accordingly, protected, as human beings of equal 
dignity and moral worth.     
 
The characteristics ascribed to these ‘failed’ consumers mirror those of the undesirable 
resident of Victorian St. Giles: sexual promiscuity, criminality, and racialised deviancy.99 
As Clarke and Newman write, ‘[c]ertainly, Victorian fears and fantasies about the 
disorderly, dangerous and depraved lower orders have uncomfortable similarities with 
contemporary obsessions with the urban ‘underclass’ in its many guises (hoodies, chavs, 
single mothers, the feckless and the workshy)’.100 These groups can be ‘discursively 
ghettoised – hived off from the general population as a special problem.101 Once conceived 
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of as a special problem, special solutions can be put in place to manage and contain them.  
The ‘undeserving’ poor, immigrants, the dependant – for instance those with disabilities or 
unemployed young people – once again emerge as the subject of projects of improvement 
and/or restraint.  In current housing policy, this attitude manifests in policies such as the 
‘bedroom tax’, which sees housing benefit cut for those deemed to be ‘under occupying’ 
council housing.102  It manifests in policies which enable local authorities to place homeless 
individuals in areas distant from their social and familial ties, their children’s schools and 
their places of employment.103  These policies treat the residents of social housing as less 
than full members of the political and social fabric, and call into question any commitment 
to their human rights, their dignity and their equal moral worth.   
 
The commodification of housing thus results in the opening of a wide gulf between the 
failed consumer, relegated to residualised social housing, and the able market consumer of 
housing.  The effect on the ‘failed’ consumer is at best paternalistic, at worst derisive.  And 
it has strong echoes in previous housing policy that catered generally to the better off 
working classes, and tended to ignore the most marginalised and disempowered.  But the 
effect on the ‘able’ consumer is also profound, and it points to continuities in English 
housing policy, rather than fundamental shifts.   
 
In the next section, I argue that the financialisation of housing – the instrumentalisation of 
housing as security for and on global financial markets – perpetuates housing as an 
instrument for economic progress.  In instrumentalising housing in this way, housing 
remains a tool to achieve greater societal aims, driven from the top, and aimed at producing 




3.  The ‘Leveraged Investor’: Housing Financialisation 
 
 
In the 2011 housing strategy for England, then Prime Minster (David Cameron) and deputy 
Prime Minister (Nick Clegg) wrote that ‘one of the most important things each generation 
can do for the next is to build high quality homes that will stand the test of time.’104  As 
such, it was ‘right for government to step in and take bold action to unblock the market.’105  
Accordingly, the government had two main aims in its housing strategy: first, economic 
                                                 
102 Reduction of housing benefit for those occupying council housing and deemed to have a ‘spare room’ 
was introduced in April 2013 and is commonly referred to as the Bedroom Tax. The Department for Work 
and Pensions Evaluation of Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy: Interim Report (DWP Research Report No 
882, July 2014), found that in 50% of cases, affected households were forced to make cuts to other 
household essentials or incur debts in order to be able to pay the rent, and 20% of households had been 
unable to meet the increased rent at all.  For further analysis of the impact see K Gibb, ‘The Multiple Policy 
Failures of the UK Bedroom Tax’ (2015) 15(2) International Journal of Housing Policy 148; Hohmann 
Protecting the Right to Housing in England (n 7) 13; S Moffatt et al ‘A Qualitative Study of the Impact of 
the UK “Bedroom Tax”’ (2016) 38(2) Journal of Public Health 197. 
103 The Localism Act of 2011 allows Local Housing Authorities to place homeless households or individuals 
outside their own authority.  For analysis, see D Garvie, ‘Location, Location: How Localism is Shunting 
Homeless Families Out’ (The Guardian, 7 February 2012) at https://www.theguardian.com/housing-
network/2012/feb/07/location-localism-homeless-families-shelter (accessed 23 Oct 2017). 
104 Her Majesty’s Government, Laying the Foundations: A Housing Strategy for England (November 2011) 
v. 
105 Id.  




growth through housing,106 and second, to ‘spread opportunity in our society.’107  Although 
‘quality homes that will stand the test of time’ are needed, the action the government 
proposed to take was to promote general economic growth achieved through housing, and 
the amorphous ‘spreading’ of opportunity.   
 
Where, then, do the individuals and households fit in this housing policy picture?  Recent 
housing policy imagines, values and promotes the home owner as an entrepreneurial 
financial actor, a ‘leveraged investor.’108  The homeowner has been subject to a subtle, yet 
fundamental, reinvention.  Rather than the ‘thrifty, prudential owner’109 who, as the 1971 
White Paper put it, ‘builds up by steady saving a capital asset for himself and his 
dependents,’110 the house as asset is now the platform from which the homeowner is enticed 
– and expected – to enter the broader global financial market. The homeowner as leveraged 
investor both supports and perpetuates a global financial market that is ‘funded, insured and 
to an extent marketed and managed,’ by financial services which link households’ everyday 
activities into the world of global finance.111 
 
The English approach to housing’s commodification through schemes promoting 
homeownership and ‘unlocking the market’ is merely one manifestation of a much larger, 
global trend in which housing has come to be a fundamental element of the global financial 
system.112  Contemporary housing finance derives not only from national savings but from 
global financial markets: housing is, accordingly, ‘financialised’ becoming ‘critical’ to, or 
even a ‘central pillar of’ the broader financial market itself.113   
 
The financialisation of housing is dependent on loans against the value of the house, 
generally, that is, on mortgages.  A house owned outright by the occupier is, in and of itself, 
no use in a financialised housing system unless or until further borrowing is made against 
the asset.  It is where the loan against the value of the house links in to the global financial 
circuit that ‘economic growth through housing’114 can be pursued. 
 
The Westminster government has actively pursued policies of housing finance.115 These 
include policies and programmes designed to finance, or encourage the financing of, the 
cost of housing through the provision of loans (such as mortgages) or grants (such as tax 
exemptions)116 which are made possible by and enforced in law.  As the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing notes: 
  
Financialization is made possible through the legal enforcement of agreements 
between lenders and borrowers.  It relies on legal systems governing property 
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rights, zoning laws and contracts and also on an increasingly complex system 
of international and regional treaties governing the terms and conditions of 
investments and government actions that may have an impact on 
profitability.117   
 
Notably, the legal regime governing global investments is normally designed to trump or 
exclude human rights concerns, penalising parties when they reject investment for reasons 
of social or environmental justice, for example.118 
 
Such policies and their enforcement though law, have helped loop homes into global 
financial flows, which both enable the purchase of mortgages in England, and which trade 
in those mortgages across the world.   
 
The financialised housing system depends on speculative trading on mortgage debts.  Where 
once a mortgagor issued the mortgage, collected and monitored payments, and held the asset 
- the house – on their balance sheet until the interest and principal was paid off, now, assets 
are broken down into bundles of risk factors.119 This practice both spreads risks broadly, 
and enables profit to be made not only from the asset but from risks themselves.120 
Housing’s materiality – its tangible, solid, presence, is de-materialised, broken down and 
rendered into intangible bundles of asset and risk. As Smith writes, ‘The UK model is a 
financial markets model whose rationale is to blur the boundary between (fixed) capital and 
(fluid) money.121   
 
The buying and selling of mortgage debts enables the bricks and mortar homes of individual 
occupiers to become security for global financial transactions.  Accordingly, the continued 
profitability of the financial system rests to a large extent on perpetuating the purchase of 
mortgages. This also means that the profitability of the financial system rests heavily on 
perpetuating an ideology of homeownership,122 both as the preferred lifestyle choice, and 
because it is presented as a way to enable households to access their share of increasing 
asset wealth.123  Given that the global financial system is insatiable, demanding ever more 
to generate increased wealth, and thus the domestic economic growth that is the stated aim 
of housing policy – at least in the 2011 Westminster incarnation - buying a home is not 
enough.  Rather, property ownership is presented as a ladder.  The assumption is that a first 
home purchase is merely a step onto the first rung, from which the homeowner will seek to 
climb higher, each rung representing a more expensive home, and therefore a more valuable 
asset. A central commitment in the Conservative party manifesto of 2015 was ‘to help more 
people onto and up the housing ladder.’124  Homeownership remains the unquestioned 
policy preference, but people should also strive to own ever better (that is, more valuable) 
housing assets.   
 
In parallel to the ways that social housing has been denigrated in earlier Westminster 
policies, current policy strives to make leveraged investing through home owning appealing, 
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while rendering the alternatives unattractive and poorly supported.125  Recent initiatives in 
this respect centre around an extended right to buy for tenants, the policy of the forced sale 
of high-value council houses, and increased rents and decreased security of tenure for sitting 
social housing tenants.126   At the same time, the financialization of housing has inflated 
property prices to the extent that the prospect of purchasing a home, or even renting on the 
private market, is now illusory for many, particularly for those in major global cities such 
as London or Sydney.127  Financialization has led to ‘unprecedented housing precarity.’128 
 
As homeowners are always considered as potential sellers, moving on up the housing ladder, 
so too in the world of financialised housing, the relationship between the material (the house 
as security) and the immaterial (the financial transaction) is at best fleeting.  It is in the very 
speed and number of transactions that more value is generated.  As Lokjine writes: ‘the 
profitability of a given economic sector will depend …on the rate of profit and the speed of 
rotation of the capital invested.’129  In the whirl of transactions, the fixed-point of the 
materially existing house appears tangential, and it is easy to forget that the owner-occupier, 
the mortgagee, is the lynch-pin of the system.  What happens to the owner occupier, as a 
person, appears to be irrelevant to the financial system: her reasons for purchasing her 
house, her need for a safe, secure home for herself and her family, her ties to neighbours, 
schools, relatives or cultural life are obscured.  The gulf between the financialisation of 
housing, and housing as a human right to protect and ensure the dignity and equal moral 
worth of individuals and families is wide, and has led the United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Adequate housing to remark that a financialised housing system cannot, by its nature, 
ensure the right to housing of individuals.130  
 
But the disappearance of the owner-occupier from the picture also has had explosive 
implications for the globalised financial system: speculative mortgages came to fuel a 
financial bubble with little relationship to their actual value or the risk attendant on them.131  
A collective amnesia appeared to seize financial actors and their regulators that the owner 
occupier at the heart of the matter could seldom afford her mortgage.  Even when the 
financial crisis hit, Sassen reminds us: ‘the source of the subprime mortgage crisis, as 
discussed in financial circles, pertains to the secondary financial circuit rather than the fact 
of millions of households losing their homes to foreclosure.’132  In other words, the crisis is 
seen as a crisis for the system, not primarily for individuals and their relationships to house 
as home and shelter.     
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Yet, as Langley forcefully reminds us, the ‘extraordinary gyrations’133 that gripped capital 
markets after the global financial crisis arose ‘out of ruptures in the ordinary payment 
routines of mortgagors.’134  The crisis was, and is, a crisis for ordinary people.  As the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Housing reports, ‘Financialized housing markets have caused 
displacement and evictions at an unparalleled scale: in the United States of America over 
the course of 5 years, over 13 million foreclosures resulted in more than 9 million 
households being evicted.  In Spain, more than half a million foreclosures between 2008 
and 2013 resulted in 300,000 evictions.  There were almost 1 million foreclosures between 
2009 and 2012 in Hungary.’135 In the global south, evictions and displacement are also 
caused by global financialization of housing, which subverts housing and land as social 
good in favour of their value as commodities.136 In the UK, high levels of foreclosure and 
eviction were forestalled by the government’s bailout of a number of banks.137 This action, 
however, also led to increased austerity measures, at the same time that it implicated the 
government further in global housing financialisation.138 
 
The global financial crisis showcased in a spectacular way the inequalities at the heart of 
the financialised housing system.  Greater inclusion in financial markets cannot be equated 
with greater equality.  ‘Creative’139 mortgage products designed specifically for those who 
would normally be excluded from the mortgage market had enabled the selling of ‘sub-
prime’ mortgages, often at highly disadvantageous rates and terms, to poorer households.140 
These have the effect of ‘redlining’ those who are socio-economically disadvantaged.141  
Poorer and minority households remain subject to discriminatory treatment in the market 
through the imposition of higher interest rates and other penalising terms and conditions.142  
In the English housing system, inequality is ‘amplified’ rather than diminished.143   
 
The dignity and worth of the person seeking safe, adequate and secure housing have been 
pushed aside in a quest for ever greater investment profits, both for firms and for 
governments whose policies – and not only their housing policies – rest on a financialised 
housing system.  Social housing, insofar as it functions outside the financialised housing 
system, is of no use to it, and so must either be commoditised and made ripe for 
financialisation, or must fall by the wayside. Although tenants of private rental 
accommodation are often living in housing purchased as an investment, as the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Housing has noted, financialised housing has no need for an occupier.  She 
writes that financialised housing ‘is valuable whether it is vacant or occupied, lived in or 
devoid of life.’144  Housing is dehumanised to the point where its actual, practical use to the 
individuals who might live in it and build their lives outwards from it, is of little concern. 
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IV The Right to Housing as the Foundation for a More Positive Housing Policy 
 
The right to housing – as a rallying cry and as a principle underpinning all housing policy – 
can place the individual, her agency, dignity and personhood, back at the centre of housing 
policy.  The right to housing, in this sense, can function as an important insistence on the 
person behind the social tenancy, subsumed behind that monolithic, freighted, phrase: the 
‘council estate.’145 The right to housing provides a counterpoint to the financial sleight of 
hand that makes the owner-occupier all but disappear from view while her house becomes 
a convenient source of potential tradable value on the global financial mortgage circuit.  
How might the right to housing provide for a person-centred housing policy, or reign in 
housing policies that treat the dweller as merely incidental?   
 
Like any human right (or any policy measure) alone, the right to housing does not provide 
a silver-bullet solution to all housing problems.  However, we can find examples that 
demonstrate how the right to housing can be used to guide governments towards housing 
policy that takes account of the equal moral worth and dignity of the human being, and that 
makes the dweller and her need for safe, adequate housing, the central unit of concern.  The 
first example stems from the protection of the right to housing under the South African 
Constitution.  The second is drawn from the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ approach to the commodification and financialisation of the right to housing in the 
Individual Complaint Djazia and Bellili  v Spain146 under the ICESCR Optional Protocol.147 
Both examples illustrate that the right to housing requires housing policy that does not treat 
human beings, and particularly, the most marginalised and vulnerable, as merely 
instrumental to larger goals of economic and social policy.   
 
 
1) The South African Constitutional Court’s Approach to the Right to Housing and 
South African Housing Policy  
 
Recognising that the denial of access to housing was an explicit tool of exclusion and 
discrimination in South Africa’s Apartheid-era State, the 1996 post-Apartheid Constitution 
includes an explicit, judicially enforceable right to housing in Section 26. 148   Section 26(1) 
states that: 
 
Everyone has a right to have access to adequate housing. 
 
Which is followed by Section 26(2)’s requirement that:  
 
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve progressive realisation of this right.   
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Section 26(3) prohibits arbitrary evictions, and requires a court order before any eviction or 
demolition.  As a whole, Section 26 must be interpreted within a Constitution that aims to 
be socially transformative, and which is premised on social justice.149  The right of the child 
to shelter is also included in Section 28(1)(c).  While shelter is a barer form of provision 
than adequate housing, Section 28 is not limited by the progressive realisation standard 
introduced in Section 26(2).  
 
The South African Constitutional Court’s has sought (not always successfully) to strike a 
balance between appropriate deference for State housing policy, attentiveness to the serious 
lack of resources in the state, and making the right to housing meaningful in the context of 
severe housing deprivation rooted in a legacy of social and spatial injustice.   
 
In the path breaking Grootboom judgment,150 the Constitutional Court evaluated the 
reasonableness of the government’s housing policy against its obligations for the right to 
housing.  It held that the right requires: 
 
available land, appropriate services, such as the provision of water and the 
removal of sewage and the financing of all of these, including the building of 
the house itself … There must be land, there must be services, there must be 
a dwelling.151 
 
Access to adequate housing would, the Court further noted, involve private parties who must 
be enabled by the state ‘by legislative and other measures to provide housing.’152  The Court 
stated that government obligations would be different for those with the financial means to 
pay, for whom ‘the state’s primary obligation is unlocking the system, providing access to 
housing stock and … facilitat[ing] self-built houses through planning laws and access to 
finance’ and for those without financial means, for whom the socio-economic rights of the 
Constitution become key.153  The Court stated that action will be fundamental to meeting 
the state’s obligations: merely having law on the books will not be enough, and such laws 
will need to be implemented through policies.154  
 
In the same case the Court set out that it will take a ‘reasonableness’ approach to interpreting 
the state’s obligation for realising the right.  That is:   
 
the precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily 
a matter for the legislature and the executive.  They must, however, ensure 
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that the measures they adopt are reasonable … A court considering 
reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable 
measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent.  The question would be whether the measures that have been 
adopted are reasonable.155   
 
Crucially, for the argument advanced in this paper, reasonableness must be assessed against 
the State’s underlying human rights commitments, and the principles that they protect.  The 
Court stated that:   
 
The right of access to adequate housing is entrenched because we value human 
beings and want to ensure that they are afforded their basic human needs. A 
society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided to all 
if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality. … 
Furthermore, the Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care 
and concern.156    
 
Ultimately, in the Grootboom case, the Court held that the State’s housing policies failed to 
meet its obligations under Section 26 of the Constitution.  This was because the housing 
plan had not taken account of all segments of the population, particularly falling short in 
providing a plan for the worst off, such as the plaintiffs in the case, who were homeless and 
destitute. 
 
The inclusion of a right to housing in the South African Constitution has not solved of the 
state’s housing problems, which remain significant. A wealth of legislative measures and 
policy initiatives have been launched, but spatial injustice, entrenched poverty and 
marginalisation continue, and have even increased since the adoption of the Post-Apartheid 
Constitution.157  Nor has the Court’s approach to interpreting and enforcing the right to 
housing been free of criticism.  I, among others, have argued that the Court has left the 
normative content of the right empty, resulting in a thin right which can be used to review 
procedural action but has little substance: reasonableness turns on the steps taken, rather 
than the results achieved.158  Strauss and Liebenberg have argued further that the Court’s 
jurisprudence has failed to come to terms with the systemic issues that underlie the violation 
of the right to housing, and that the Court’s oversight of housing policies fails to grapple 
with the fact that ‘decision-making processes, which value notions of economic efficiency 
over substantively just housing outcomes, can have potentially devastating social, material 
and spatial consequences for vulnerable communities’.159 
 
Despite these shortcomings, what the Constitutional Court’s approach does demonstrate is 
that the right to housing can be used as the guiding principle to help create a more positive 
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housing policy.  In the Grootboom case, the Government was held to be failing in its 
constitutional obligations due to its failure to take account of the needs of the most 
marginalised and the worst off.  In other cases, the Court has used Section 26 and the 
reasonableness test to give voice to marginalised communities in the context of housing 
policy through requirements for consultation and participation in schemes for housing 
regeneration, for example.160   
 
Similar requirements could be incorporated into Westminster housing policy to ensure that 
it keeps the individual, and particularly the marginalised and vulnerable , firmly in view as 
a subject of care and concern, dignity and freedom.  Such underpinning principles could 
(and in fact are beginning to) be used to contest the deracination of poorer communities, the 
silencing of their voices, and the ‘regeneration’ of their housing for luxury flats and 
investment opportunities, which have resulted in evictions and forced relocations, and – in 




2) The CESCR Decision in Djazia and Bellili  v Spain  
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has only recently begun to 
consider individual complaints under the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.  In its recent 
decision, Djazia and Bellili v Spain,162 the Committee considered whether the eviction of 
Mohamed Ben Djazia, Naouel Bellili and their two infant children from their privately 
rented flat, which resulted in their homelessness, breached Spain’s obligations under Article 
11 of the ICESCR.  
 
Article 11(1) provides that:  
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an 
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this 
right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-
operation based on free consent. 
 
The CESCR has interpreted the right to housing, as an element of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, as requiring seven elements, each of which must be at least minimally 
enjoyed.  These include security of tenure, habitability, and affordability.163  Evictions, 
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when they occur, should not render the evictees homeless.164  Further detail of the State’s 
obligations for Article 11(1) are set out in Article 2(1) of the Covenant, which details that:  
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
 
Article 11(1), read in conjunction with Article 2(1), includes both positive and negative 
aspects, and imposes immediate obligations as well as those that may be realised over time.  
Immediate obligations include non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the right,165 and the 
provision of the minimum core of each of the elements of the right.166 Progressive 
obligations, meanwhile, require the state to make progress toward the full realisation of the 
right.167  The right to housing under ICESCR, should, therefore, oblige states to ensure that 
all individuals, regardless of economic or social power, have access to adequate housing in 
order to enjoy the right, and to make progress towards the better enjoyment of the right. 
 
The Ben Djazia/Bellili family had rented a privately owned apartment under a fixed term 
tenancy since 1998.168 Mr. Ben Djazia had been applying for social housing for over a 
decade,169 after becoming unemployed, he lost entitlement to unemployment benefits, and 
the family fell into arrears.170  When the tenancy expired, they had nowhere else to go and 
remained in the property.171 The family were evicted after court proceedings, and while the 
Court urged both local and regional social services to take all appropriate measures to 
prevent the destitution of the family, upon eviction they were made homeless.172 After 10 
days in temporary accommodation, they were forced to live in the family car for a time.173 
 
The Committee found that the state was obligated to provide suitable alternate 
accommodation, and this required them to take all necessary measures to that end, to the 
maximum of its available resources.  In this respect, the decision reflects the long-standing 
prohibition in international law on forced eviction which will render the evictee homeless.174 
 
While this requirement in itself may require changes in Spanish law more important with 
respect to housing policy is in the Committee’s statement that the State party must take 
measures to tackle the structural causes of homelessness and housing vulnerability.175 In 
particular, the Committee criticised the State’s housing policy on two fronts.  First:   
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The Committee considers the State party’s arguments as insufficient to demonstrate 
that it has made all possible effort, using all available resources, to realize, as a 
matter of urgency, the right to housing of persons who, like the authors, are in a 
situation of dire need. For example, the State party did not explain that denying the 
authors social housing was necessary because it was putting its resources towards a 
general policy or an emergency plan to be implemented by the authorities with a 
view to progressively realizing the right to housing, especially for persons in a 
particularly vulnerable situation.176  
 
That is, although the state would have been able to provide a justification for the denial of 
social housing to the family, this policy justification would itself have had to comply with 
the State’s obligations under the right to housing.  Harkening back to the South African 
approach, the Committee also noted that the policy would have to take particular account 
of the vulnerable or those in situations of dire need.177  
 
Second, the Committee criticised the State’s housing policy specifically on the grounds of 
the commoditisation and financialisation of social housing stock. The Committee noted 
that, despite having given the reason as the need to ‘balance the budget’178: 
 
the State party has not explained to the Committee why the regional authorities in 
Madrid … sold part of the public housing stock to investment companies, thereby 
reducing the availability of public housing, despite the fact that the number of public 
housing units available annually in Madrid was significantly fewer than the demand, 
nor has it explained how this measure was duly justified and was the most suitable 
for ensuring the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. 179 
 
While the Committee acknowledged that the State had a ‘certain latitude’180 in disposing of 
its resources and making budgetary decisions, and that in times of serious economic crisis 
backward steps might be possible,181 such steps – and in particular, the sale of social housing 
– had not been proven necessary in this case.182 
 
This bold statement on the part of the CESCR indicates that the Committee will scrutinise 
a state’s housing policies in the broadest sense, as well as reinforcing the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Adequate Housing’s position that a financialised housing system by 
definition violates the right to housing.183 The Committee’s approach demonstrates how the 
right to housing can be used to place the individual human being at the centre of the policy 
question, and to hold the state to account when it fails to do so, even while acknowledging 
that States have latitude in their policy decisions.   
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The decision is particularly important in that it demonstrates how the right to housing can 
be used to counter action that is justified on the abstract basis that it will make more housing 
available through financialisation and market growth, while in the concrete instance making 
marginalised individuals and families homeless.  Such reasoning based on human rights 
principles could be used, for example, to counter the sale and privatisation of social housing, 
particularly where the benefits cannot be shown to flow to the most marginalised and 
vulnerable individuals and communities.   
 
 
V CONCLUSION  
 
 
The dehumanising capacity of housing policy is all too clear in the policy history traced 
above.  Grand visions of social change through housing have often rested on philanthropic 
paternalism.  These visions are problematic, especially when they are imposed not for the 
good of the individual, but for the larger good, and are at their worst when imposed out of 
self-interest.   Similarly, the commodification and financialisation of housing have been 
underpinned by discourses that remove the person as a human being with a need for safe, 
adequate and secure housing, from the centre of housing policy replacing her with a 
consumer or ‘leveraged investor.’  The commodification of housing relies on a conception 
of individuals as consumers of housing, placing the emphasis on the house as asset.  In the 
case of financialisation, the emphasis is on the financial instrument for the good of the 
financial system as a whole.  Absent an ever increasing thirst for homeownership, which for 
most can only be slaked with a mortgage, global economic growth through housing 
financialisation cannot be sustained.  As such, financial institutions – and many national 
governments – have an incentive to perpetuate policies of homeownership in market 
conditions. Yet, despite deep ideological commitments by governments to homeownership 
as an inherent good,184 financialisation enables the removal of the occupier as a person of 
any individual worth or agency, and perhaps even more startlingly, enables the removal of 
the occupier as a unit of any significance at all.185 
 
Human rights, however, place the individual and her agency, dignity and personhood at the 
centre of every question.  Although open to interpretation and political negotiation as to 
their meaning, scope and content, human rights create lines that governments cannot cross, 
and ensure certain standards of decency – of humanity – for each person.  As a human right, 
the right to housing offers a powerful response to the dehumanising tendencies of housing 
policy. Taking a human rights approach to housing policy, we could draw on examples from 
South Africa, and the individual Complaints mechanism under the ICESCR.  In South 
Africa, housing policy is measured explicitly against the principles of human rights, and 
these principles, which are enshrined in the Constitution, can be used to ensure that housing 
policy takes account of the rights and needs of the most marginalised and worst off, and to 
give voice to those most in need of housing.  The CESCR, which is only now beginning to 
develop a body of case law on the right to housing under Article 11(1) of ICESCR, has 
already demonstrated that the right can be used to insist that policies that render individuals 
and families homeless, in service of larger economic or political goals, will be 
impermissible.  In this way, they insist on the equal moral worth of each person.   
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When the discussion of housing shifts from the personal, familial or household level to those 
macro levels where housing is understood in the aggregate, the policies and discussions 
around it can all too quickly become divorced from any consideration of the people who 
live in it.  In England, the dehumanisation of housing policy in the present is one 
manifestation of a chain of historical processes, in which housing has played a role in the 
creation of productive and pacified workers, self-sufficient asset holders, and leveraged 
investors.  Yet at its heart, any discussion or conception of housing should be about the 
human person who lives, or will live, in the house, even when other interests will often play 
a role.  The material fact of being housed has a crucial connection with our enjoyment of 
privacy, the construction of our identities, our ability to exercise autonomy and freedom, 
and participate in society as full human beings and legal subjects.186  We can make a 
commitment to the role housing plays in the dignity and equal moral worth of the human 
being when we make a commitment to treating housing as a right, and placing the dweller 
at the centre of every policy question.  The right to housing, thus, offers a touchstone for the 
creation of a more positive housing policy, one that takes into account every person as a 
human person, not just for her potential as a productive worker, self-regulating and 
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